“It’s time for a rebirth of our democracy. Our voting system is broken. When arrogant Liberal majorities can break promises with absolute impunity and give our tax dollars to their friends, it’s time for a new voting system. . . . It’s time citizens were asked if our voting system needs fixing and it’s time politicians listened to citizens on the voting system they own. So let’s have an electoral system that gives effect to the will of the people instead of standing in the way of the will of the people. Three elections in a row now—in fact, I think we can say four, if we add in the year 2000, maybe even more, but certainly those four—we’ve had less than forty percent of the people voting for a government, and yet that government gets the power. It’s absurd, wrong, and totally undemocratic. Let’s grab a hold of this—people can now see how dysfunctional it is—and let’s bring proportional representation to Canada, so that political parties can run, they can lay out their program, people can vote for those parties, and their vote will not get essentially cast aside and disrespected by a result that puts in power the very party that was explicitly not the choice of the majority.”
“I think proportional representation is the model for Canada, because we have a multi-party system and have had for a very long period of time in this country. It’s part of our political culture here, going back many decades, and different parties come and go as a part of that process. But what we haven’t had is an effective way to translate that process into seats in the House and reflect the democratic will of the people.”
“It’s not that these models don’t exist. They exist virtually everywhere else in modern democracies. We are not a modern democracy. We’re using a system that was invented before the telephone—which was invented by a Canadian, or in Canada. We certainly make that plain. And, in fact, we’ve gone on to invent the BlackBerry here. We’ve gone through quantum leaps to perform in other areas, but we’ve left a system of representation in place from the Gutenberg era, including an unelected Senate, which is bad enough. But we have a first-past-the-post voting system that even the originators of that system in Britain have begun to replace, in terms of what’s been going on with Scotland and Wales, and could well come to Great Britain itself. Who knows? But for heaven’s sakes, let’s get moving here. ”
(stolen from fairvote.ca page entitled “jack layton on proportional representation“)ctv interview june 23, 2004-jack layton (1950-2011)
when discussing the prospects of democratic reform, inevitably we run into the troubles of apathy. among electorate and the elected, the will to achieve meaningful restructuring to true representation in governance can, at times, appear to be simply a matter of rational choice. but below the substrate of game theory models, there are additional factors in instituting change in representational effectiveness.
voter turnout within democratic systems indicate massive voter apathy or electorate disenfranchisement, but only in the case of apathy is the groundwork prepared by structural failures in the certain features of certain democratic systems. there is no shortage of electoral reform organizations producing constant suggestions for the improvement of the voting public’s perceptions, considered directly related to the factors involved in a “desire for change” movement.
one the most antiquated systems is perfectly illustrated in canada’s single member plurality system, accurately described as a first past the post structure that discounts votes cast for losers in election races. these “wasted” votes create a quandary for the electorate. if the common perception is that their preferred candidate cannot achieve victory, any vote cast will have no effect on the overall outlook post-election, and as such, no input on policy development (if election campaigns can even be thought of as policy development, anymore) within the national context.
the SMP system also seems to directly affect the ability of minority or special interest groups to access official political forums because of the tendency for independent political movements split votes in ridings, weakening opposition power bases and creating further perceived voter disenfranchisement.
Simon Fraser University, Canadian Electoral Reform
Strengths of Single Member Plurality (SMP)
There are several direct advantages of using the single member plurality system. First, it is far more likely to produce majority governments in a competitive multi-party system. In the 12 federal elections held in the last 40 years, 8 have resulted in majority governments, even though the winning party won a majority of votes only once, in 1984. Majority governments are said to provide stable government and allow direct accountability to the electorate. In contrast, partners in a minority or coalition government can either point fingers at each other or each claim credit at the next election.
SMP also facilitates clear community representation. With the 2004 elections, Canada is divided into 308 constituencies each with their own representative to speak on behalf of local interests.
Disadvantages of SMP Systems
The are a number of disadvantages to the SMP system. The most important is that a party’s share of the votes only rarely bears any semblance to the share of seats they win. A candidate only needs one more vote than her or his opponents. The winner’s votes beyond that number are “wasted” while the votes for all the other candidates do not help in electing other members of their parties.
Examples of vote/seat distortion abound in Canadian elections. The clearest example is found in the 1987 New Brunswick provincial election, in which the Liberal Party won all the seats in the legislature on the strength of about 60% of the vote. The other 40% of the electorate were left with no direct representation of their policy interests in the legislature.
In the 1997 federal elections, two other serious problems emerged. In Ontario, the Liberals won 99 out of 101 the province’s seats. However, a bare majority of voters had voted for other candidates. In PEI, the Liberals won all four seats on the basis of about 45% of the vote.
In the 2006 New Brunswick, 1998 Quebec, 1996 BC, and 1986 Saskatchewan provincial elections, parties won a majority of seats even though they had placed second in the overall province-wide total of the votes.
The distortion in vote and seat share can be seen in the following charts of selected elections:
1997. 1993, & 1988 Federal Elections1997 & 1993 Alberta Elections
so current the current system encourages majority governments and stifles outlying voices. this fact alone should suggest that our electoral system is incompatible with our values, but further evidence is shown in regional voter turnout percentages from 2008 and 2011, where turnout in races considered foregone conclusions reached all-time lows, and overall voter turnout hovers at around 60%. proportionally, the government in power obtained 39.6% of possible votes, yet retains 54 % of the seats in the house of commons. independent parties outlying the big five received 0.9% of the popular vote, yet no structure exists to represent these interests.
any development of democratic reforms within current structures must be willing to acknowledge the grave inequality weaved into such a system, undermining the very values our forefathers sought to entrench in the foundations. our archaic mechanism seems laughably inadequate for accommodating the endless combination of values and ideas our electorate truly is made of. to have a system that truly describes a constituency, we must rethink our dogmatic approach to stability as an extension of longevity.
the idea that stability exists only in majority governments is on the surface a simple logic equation, but further case studies show that regardless of the control ration of political mechanisms, government stability is more a question of policy, rather then majority. the reason is simple. policy is what gives the party its mandate to govern, providing that policy was discussed and shaped during the feedback loop of electoral campaigning. notions of the need for absolute control seem as antiquated as the system itself, unwilling or unable to cope with the complex demands from an increasingly dissatisfied electorate.
so… any chance for change? the factors required for democratic reform have been aptly described over the years as rational choice progression, where those who had a greater chance of greater power push for reform policies to make power more equitably shared, but one factor often subtler in nature applies pressure in less direct ways. correlation between reform and public desire are well documented.
Cultural explanations of electoral reform: A policy cycle model
by Pippa Norris, (harvard kennedy school)The standard rational choice account of the process of electoral reform suggests that parties seek to maximize their seat gains arising from alternatives electoral rules. This approach generates a series of empirically‐testable predictions; all other things being equal, for instance, smaller parties are predicted to prefer power‐sharing rules, while larger parties are expected to advocate power concentrating rules. Strategic bargaining among decision‐makers in the legislative arena is assumed to determine the outcome. Although an elegant and parsimonious theory, the rational choice approach fits uneasily with the wealth of counter‐evidence provided by historical descriptions of specific institutional changes occurring within particular countries. Detailed accounts of electoral reform, notably the well‐known cases of Italy, New Zealand, Israel, and the UK, as well as many accounts of the process of regime change elsewhere, usually emphasize the incremental, contingent, sui generis, pathdependent, and multifaceted nature of the policymaking process, as well as the often unexpected nature of the outcome, defeating attempts to foresee partisan benefits. Moreover the rational choice account focuses upon legislative elites without considering the broader context set by public opinion, both how perceptions of political legitimacy constrain rule‐changes as well as occasionally pressuring legislators to address reform issues.
Case studies suggest that, at least in democratic states, reservoirs of political legitimacy dampen the prospects of reform, where public opinion acts as ballast which anchors institutions within cultural constraints. Conversely, more critical evaluations about the fairness and honesty of specific elections, and weaker feelings of regime legitimacy, are expected to strengthen prospects for change, driving reforms from below. The survey evidence derived from multiple societies presented in this study shows that public opinion should not be discounted, confirming the observations that many case studies of specific reforms have usually emphasized. The policy cycle model provides a more satisfactory and comprehensive framework to understand the multiple actors engaged in any institutional changes – and the steps in the process from the process of agenda‐setting through the public policy agenda to the legislative outcome, the administrative and legal process of implementation, and the final feedback loop leading back to public opinion. The framework facilitates further research identifying the role of multiple actors‐ such as the Election Management Bodies, the media and NGO agendas, and referendums, as well as what occurs within the legislature and executive. Indeed to assume that the latter act in isolation from broader political processes and from the societal context, as rational choice accounts suggest, seems dangerously naïve. The main finding from the comparative empirical evidence considered here is that mass aspirations for democracy are indeed one of the factors which help to catalyze the agenda for successful reform movements and legislative initiatives. Moreover the fact that public aspirations are followed by subsequent institutional changes, even in many non‐democratic regimes, suggests that ‘reform from below’ is an important strategy which can succeed, even against elite interests. That the effects of this process are evident is all the more remarkable given the long chain of causality and the multiple actors and many complex stages which are required in the process of institutional reform. The results should hearten democratic forces and mass reform movements everywhere which are seeking to strengthen democratic regimes and electoral institutions.
the public’s demands… one factor among many that could help institute positive representational amendments to a system long since left behind by democracy’s innovation and creativity. canada’s continued use of outdated democratic mechanisms sets the stage for massive political apathy and disconnection, skews governance toward incumbent parties, and most importantly, creates massive amounts of “wasted” ballots, which systematically punish oppositional voters through disenfranchisement. these kind of cycles make change difficult to enact, but as the harvard-kennedy study shows, reform from below is an important strategy for institutional level advances, and the task may not be as improbable as it appears.
we must demand better systems of control, proportional representation, and an increase in tools and mechanisms for democratic control. the reigns of power must be wrestled away from the current crop of political lackeys and apologists who cry publicly of their support for democratic reform, but move quickly in the opposite direction once the power rests in their hands. the canadian people value vote equality and representation in governance, and deserve unbiased treatment at the hands of their electoral system. if the current system is not reflective of this fact, it should not be considered controversial or anti-canadian to demand more from the democratic structures we employ.
like jack layton said, “…for heaven’s sakes, let’s get moving.” the system won’t change until change is demanded of it, and struggling voter turnout only encourages status quo for those already in power. no change can be affected until the power of our convictions is apparent. no nation has a greater opportunity or a greater responsibility to lead the world in democratic reform than canada, yet our system as it stands today reflects more accurately the infancy of democracy. we must update our system to reflect the values of equality and acceptance.
for the electorate in canada, change is long overdue.
jonnydropout 
